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THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION STRUGGLE
OF THE BENGALI PEOPLE
AGAINST THE
OPPRESSION OF WEST
PAKISTAN COINCIDED
WITH AND BECAME
ENMESHED IN A MAJOR
STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL SYSTEM
n 1971, the world’s wit-
nessed theemergenceof its
136th nation, Bangladesh.
Formost analysts of the South
Asian region, thisdidnot come
by surprise. The matter why
was quite apparent for the
experts, but thewhenandhow
especially with which conse-
quences made the interna-
tional security circlesand lead-
ing politicians feel quite
uncomfortable.
After the formation of
Pakistan, in 1947, an extraor-
dinary rift existed between its
two wings, East Pakistan and
WestPakistan,whichweresep-
arated by about 2,000 km of
Indian territory. A major dif-
ference was language, with
Urdu themain and state-sup-
ported language in West
Pakistan, andBengali the sup-
pressed languageof itsEastern
part.This disparity resulted in
anethno-linguisticmovement
in the early 1950s demanding
that Bengali be made a state
language too. The movement
got further aggravated by the
tremendous economic and
political inequalities to thedis-
advantage of the Bengali peo-
ple. Inorder tomaintain supe-
riority, West Pakistan, which
treated its Eastern part as an
internal colony, responded to
notionsof autonomyandsep-
arate identity with violent
repression. Consequently, the
language movement gradual-
lybutpersistently transformed
into a struggle for independ-
ence that began with its dec-
larationon26March1971and
ended with the liberation of
Bangladesh on 16 December
1971.The trigger foropencon-
flict between East and West
Pakistanwere the 1970 gener-
al electionsand thenegligence
of the results by the then rul-
ing junta of General Yahya
Khan. In theEast itwasexpect-
ed, that Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman’s Awami League -
which won not only most of
the seats in theEast but also in
the National Parliament-
would lead the new national
government in Islamabad.
However, this was blocked by
the West Pakistani military,
which feared the lossof itsown
power and control over East
Pakistan if they handed over
authority toMujib. The estab-
lishment inWest Pakistanwas
aware that a federal adminis-
tration under Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman would lead to a tec-
tonic shift in the country’s
power structure with severe
impacts in the country’s
domestic and international
field. Inotherwords,Operation
Searchlight can be seen as a
pre-emptive strikeonpolitical
forces like the Awami League
because theycouldassert their
legitimate power. There is no
doubt that thebeginningof the
violent suppression of the
Bengali people through the
West Pakistani armed forces
marked one of the most sig-
nificant and dramatic events
on the subcontinent after its
bloody Partition in 1947.
The question that arises is
why the international com-
munitywasnotwilling or able
to stop themilitary operations
inPakistan’sEasternwing right
fromthebeginning?Of course,
Yahya Khan explicitly denied
any involvement of Pakistani
soldiers in a ‘Genocide’ and
condemned it as propaganda
against West Pakistan.
However, due to the presence
of international media and
diplomaticmissions, therewas
credible and impartial report-
ing about the start of large-
scale massacres and target-
killings inDhaka.Most remark-
able in this context were the
reports of US Consul General
ArcherBlood fromMarch27th,
1971until hewas recalled from
his post in Dhaka –obviously
for being too inconvenient.
Most significant was his last
cable on 6 April 1971, the so
called ‘Blood Telegram’, in
whichhedenounced thecom-
plicity of the US administra-
tion of then US President
RichardNixonandhisNational
Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger in the genocide. In
this context one has to state
that the whole process of
Bangladeshi state formation
didn’thappen ina‘SouthAsian
vacuum’. The national libera-
tion struggle of the Bengali
people against theoppression
ofWestPakistancoincidedwith
and became enmeshed in a
major structural transforma-
tion of the international polit-
ical system. Themost charac-
teristic feature of this phe-
nomenon was that the rigid
bipolarity determined by the
rivalling two superpowers US
and Soviet Union as well as
their firm diametrical align-
ments following theWorldWar
II was loosening. Amajor pro-
voker of this, was the Soviet-
China split which became
unbridgeable after the ideo-
logical differences between
Maoist Beijing and Marxist-
Leninist Moscow culminated
at theborder conflict between
both countries in 1969. Not
only was themyth of amono-
lithic communist camp pub-
liclybrought toanend,butalso
increasing strains within the
‘anti-communist coalition’
appeared.The raisingconflicts
over economic interests
between the US, Western
Europe and Japanmarked the
onset of a mutual alienation.
As a result, the global order in
the early 1970’s shifted from
bipolarity towards some kind
ofmulti-polarity. Even though
the ‘old polar powers’ US and
USSRwere still dominant,new
emergingplayersweregaining
more international leverage,
most notably China with its
growing economic power and
India with respect to its large
land mass and huge popula-
tion. Nevertheless, the sharp
ColdWar antagonism as well
as the omnipresent threat of a
‘ThirdWorldWar’ remained.
This very contexthad severe
implications for the
Bangladeshi independence
struggle. The political leader-
ship of the most significant
playersat theglobal scenewere
aware that thenewlyemerging
international system became
morepoliticallyvolatile.Hence,
it became more difficult to
maintain control over areas
whichwereseenaspartof their
respective influence.Especially
inWashington, after the failure
of its ‘Roll-Backpolicy’ against
Communism,as theKoreaWar
and Bay of Pigs invasion
demonstrated, a major redef-
inition of its foreignpolicywas
getting off the ground, name-
ly its ‘Détente policy’. At the
core of this decision was the
understanding thata relaxation
in the Soviet-US relations was
necessary. In order to ‘thaw’
the encrusted Cold War con-
stellation, a rapprochement
withChina –whichwould also
keep‘overambitiousnewcom-
ers’ like India at bay-was seen
as one the most eminent cor-
nerstones of this strategy.
Theoverall aimof thisnewly
introducedRealpolitik -rough-
ly characterisedbydoingaway
with ideology-based political
decisionmaking in favour of a
pragmatic approach- was to
normalize US-USSR relation,
tobalanceBeijingandMoscow
as well as to restrain the influ-
enceof the increasinglyappar-
ent alliance between New
Delhi andMoscow.
The Indo-Soviet friendship
treaty signed in August 1971
furtheraggravatedNixon’sper-
sonal antipathy against India
and her PrimeMinister Indira
Gandhi.
However, regarding his new
tilt towards Beijing Nixon had
a major problem. Despite the
fact that China under Mao
Zedongwasalso ready toopen
up towards Washington -
because itwasconfrontedwith
Soviet forces amassing at its
borders, ostensibly in prepa-
ration foran invasionofChina-
theUS had no direct access to
the Chinese leadership at that
time.This brought Pakistan in
thepicture.With thehelpof the
government in Islamabadand
the strong support of military
top brass a secret liaison
between Washington and
Beijing was facilitated. China
was increasingly seenasan‘ally
of convenience’ in order to
secure US interests in South
Asia, and Pakistan was identi-
fied as the only possible con-
duit for it.However, at thesame
time Washington was also
aware of Islamabad’s limited
capacities, especiallydue to the
tremendous asymmetric
power relations, to compete
militarily successfullywith the
Indian Union. More concrete,
USwere very sceptical regard-
ing the prospects for West
Pakistan to maintain control
over its easternwing in caseof
an armed confrontation. The
chance for Islamabad to keep
in check the Bengali aspira-
tions of liberating themselves
from theWest Pakistani choke
becomeevenpoorerwithview
on the Indian support for the
freedom fighters and the
unfavourable geographic con-
ditions. Basically the Nixon
administration fearedany for-
eign intervention into the
Bangladesh Liberation War.
The US were primarily con-
cerned about an Indian inter-
vention. Washington’s ration-
alewas that Indiawouldband-
wagonwith the struggle of the
Bengali in order to finally set-
tle its scores with Islamabad
with dramatic consequences.
It was expected that, if India
helped tosetEastPakistan free,
it would be dragged in New
Delhi’s slipstreamand thereby
be turned into another client
state of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, there were seri-
ous concerns amongUSsecu-
rity circles that Indiawoulduse
the event to send it troops
towards Islamabad tooust the
pro-US military regime and
perhapseven todismember its
neighbour. Given the fact that
Washington saw the Pakistani
military as the most suitable
partner foraccommodatingUS
interests in thePakistani rump-
state and the extended region,
an Indian intervention was
perceived as an existential
threat toUS interests: itwould
lose its only ally on the sub-
continent which also provid-
ed the key towards China. To
prevent such a scenario from
happening, Washington
announced a policy of ‘maxi-
mum intimidation’ against
India. Therefore, US naval
forces were sent into the Bay
ofBengal andChinawasasked
to amass troops at the Indian
frontier to increasepressureon
the Indians. At the same time,
theUS attempted to enforce a
ceasefire through the UN
Security Council (UNSC) to
protect Pakistan from a mili-
tarily enforced break-up.
However, none of these
measuresof theNixonadmin-
istrationworkedoutas intend-
ed. First, the US proposal for
ceasefire at the UNSC got
vetoed by the Soviets. Second,
the Chinese did not build-up
much military pressure on its
borderswith India.Third,New
Delhiwasnot impressedby the
American ‘gunboat diploma-
cy’ and just ignored the pres-
ence of the 7th fleet of the US
in ‘its waters’. Instead, it inter-
vened andBangladesh gained
its independence.But themost
fundamentalmistakeofNixon
and Kissinger were their fatal
misperception of Indira
Gandhi’s intensions regarding
Pakistanand theSovietUnion.
In contrast to US fears, India
wasnotatall interested‘to slice
the West Pakistani pie’. The
alliancewith the Soviet Union
was a logical consequence of
the anti-Indian sentiments in
Washington. Inotherwords, it
wasbasedonpragmatismand
not on friendship. Therefore,
there was no threat that India
or Bangladesh be turned into
a Soviet client state. For the
sakeof completeness, it has to
be pointed out that India did-
n’t intervene in East Pakistan
because of humanitarian rea-
sonsor inorder todefenddem-
ocratic values.
Afterbeingoverwhelmedby
millions of refugees from East
Pakistan and having the
chance to weaken Pakistan,
NewDelhi’s actions in towards
East Pakistan s were as much
guided by Realpolitik as the
US’s. For example, the taking
away of all significantmilitary
equipment left in Bangladesh
byPakistan indicates that itwas
not all about thewell-being of
the Bengali people.
Nevertheless, in sum, it
seemedthat‘theworld’accept-
ed the potential separation of
East Pakistan and the forma-
tionofanewindependentstate
ofBangladeshas a fait accom-
pli. The only remaining issue
for the US, China, and partly
also for the Soviet Union was,
how to get West-Pakistan
through the‘East-Pakistancri-
sis’withas littledamageaspos-
sible.Tobesure, allmajorplay-
ers (besides India) had no
interest to get deeply involved
in the conflict, neithermilitar-
ily nor diplomatically by put-
ting sufficient pressure on
Islamabadtostop thegenocide
amongBengali people and the
pogrom-likekillingsofBengali
political leaders and intellec-
tuals.MoscowandWashington
justwanted tobesure that their
respective adversary wouldn’t
gain too much influence in
SouthAsia and thatno region-
al playerwouldgain regional a
too dominant position.
Therefore, maintaining the
contentious triangle of India-
Pakistan-China appeared the
most appropriate strategy to
maintain somekindofbalance
in South Asia. With the inde-
pendence of Bangladesh and
the preservation of territorial
integrity ofWest Pakistan, this
common goal was apparently
achieved.
Therefore, leaving aside
Pakistan, the governments of
the major powers were offi-
cially satisfied with the out-
comes of the war. The US was
able to achieve its minimum
goal to preserve an allied
Pakistani rump-state and
maintain its strength asmuch
aspossible. Furthermore itwas
able to keep the Soviet Union
out of the conflict. China was
able to stand-up against the
Soviet Union which had to
accept the sovereigntyand ter-
ritorial integrity of China.
Furthermore, theUSapproach
to seekanalliancewithBeijing
undoubtedlybolsteredChina’s
international leverage and
prestige.
This finds itmost debatable
expression ingrantingChinaa
permanent seat in the UNSC
to the detriment of Taiwan, in
October 1971. This marks a
moveagainst Indiawhichwas-
n’t granted a permanent seat
in theUNSC.Regardless, India
had been able to substantially
weaken itsenemyPakistanand
toestablishahegemonicposi-
tion in South Asia.
Furthermore, it didnot yield
under US pressure. Achieving
such an enormous success in
foreignpolicy, the IndiaGandhi
administration in New Delhi
was able to keep the increas-
ing opposition against the
increasingly autocratic style of
government at bay, at least
until shehad toproclaimstate
of emergency 1975 in order to
stay inpower.Finally theSoviet
Unionwasable tomaintain its
alliancewith India to counter-
balance China.
The Bangladesh Liberation
Wardemonstrated that theUS
and other members of the
UnitedNations (UN)werewill-
ing to fade out any esteem for
democratic principles and
human rights in order to
achieve their goal in 1971.The
prevalenceof inaction regard-
ing theGenocideof theBengali
people committed by the
Pakistan Armed Forces must
be interpreted as a clear igno-
rance of the 1948 UN
Convention on the
PunishmentandPreventionof
the Crime of Genocide
(GenocideConvention)by the
respective national govern-
ments.To retrieveat leastpart-
ly the ‘democratic reputation’
of the Western sphere, one
mightdifferentiatebetweenthe
governments and societies in
US and the bandwagoning
Western Europe. There were
deep sympathies towards the
freedomstruggleof theBengali
people among the civil soci-
eties and much activity was
carried out to pressure their
political leadership to change
the policy direction in favour
of theBengalipeople.Here, the
ground breaking article by
Anthony Mascarenhas
‘Genocide’ (Sunday Times,
June13th, 1971) functionedas
a final wake up call. This phe-
nomenon found not only its
expression that the US con-
gress was forced to pass an
embargo of weapons against
Pakistan (which was illegally
underminedbyNixon)butalso
in someof theworld’s greatest
charity events -concerts for
Bangladesh-wereorganized in
New York to raise funds and
internationalawareness for the
refugees following the
Genocide. However, these
efforts were made far too late
to change the unfortunate
course of trajectories of glob-
alpolitics.Toconclude, thevic-
tims of the Bangladesh
LiberationWar were not only
sacrificesof thePakistani army
but also of the global
Realpolitik at this time. Or in
other words, they were a pay-
off for helping the US to open
up China. However, the prize
for this policy - three million
killedBengali, 30million inter-
nally displaced persons, the
exodus of 10 million people,
the rape of hundreds of thou-
sands of women and the rav-
agingofwidepartsof thecoun-
try - was paid by the Bengali
people.
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hecontributionofhigh-
ereducation to theover-
all growth of a country
is a fact that has been recog-
nisedbypoliticians, social sci-
entists, educators, andexperts
in various fields across the
world.
As Bangladesh strives hard
to become a middle income
country in just over ten years
it is absolutely necessary for
policy planners to review the
strengths and weaknesses of
Higher Education Institutes
(HEI) in the country.Without
ensuring quality higher edu-
cation, capable of creating
indigenousknowledge, itmay
not be possible to develop
leaders competent ofmanag-
ing vital institutions, and
human resources, once
Bangladesh transforms into a
middle-income country.
The link between higher
education and development
makes it absolutelynecessary
to ensure that quality and
effective higher education is
madeavailable inorder for the
society toprogress in termsof
development encompassing
steady economic growth,
social awareness andempow-
erment of marginal commu-
nities including women, and
strengthening democracy.
This is also important for the
creationanddisseminationof
indigenous knowledge with-
out which a country’s needs
cannot be determined while
its growth may not be sus-
tained.
Before the independenceof
Bangladesh only five univer-
sities, with government fund-
ing, were functioning in the
country to serve the needs
related tohigher learning. The
context during the pre-inde-
pendence period was differ-
ent from that of the present
time in the sense that univer-
sitieswere creating graduates
capable of getting jobs in the
civil service, in thenascentpri-
vate sector, and in teaching
positions at schools and col-
leges. In addition, the role of
Dhaka University in creating
awareness among theeducat-
edmiddle classwith regard to
language, culture andnation-
al identity, of course, played
perhaps the most important
role in the creation of inde-
pendent Bangladesh.
At present with the ever
increasingnumberof students
qualifying to have access to
higher education, aparadigm
shift has occurred. The gov-
ernment, therefore, had no
optionbut to allow the setting
of HEIs (Higher Education
Institute) in theprivate sector.
The first private University in
thecountrywasestablished in
1992, and in the year 2013 the
number of private HEIs has
goneup to seventy,while state
fundedUniversities remainat
32. Also, there are two special
Universities, the National
Universityand theBangladesh
Open University.
Two International
Universities, the OIC funded
Islamic University in Gazipur
and the Asian University for
Women inChittagongarealso
functioning in the country.
Even though theUniversity
Grants Commission of
Bangladesh has keptmany of
theprivateUniversitiesunder
pressure for shifting to per-
manent premises, quite a
number of them have made
qualitative changes in teach-
ing, particularly in awardinga
four-year degree in time .
Unfortunately many Public
Universities still continue to
suffer from the so called ‘ses-
sion-jams’ and are unable to
complete academic sessions
because of extra academic
interventions that force these
Universities to shutdownaca-
demic activitieswhen semes-
ters are still on.
The private Universities
have also earned credit for
being able to publish results
within a week after the com-
pletion of final exams which
is in sharp contrast with pub-
licUniversitieswhere inmany
cases results arepublished, at
times, after sixmonthsoreven
more, following the finalexam-
inations. Private Universities
also do not allow faculty and
students to take part in polit-
ical activities although there is
no bar to voice their opinions
in forums or platforms in the
larger society. Thishashelped
the continuance of academic
activities without any inter-
ruption resulting in the com-
pletion of degrees within the
stipulated time.
Given theconsensusamong
scholars throughout theworld
as to the role ofHEIs aspower
houses of human develop-
mentandrepositoryof knowl-
edge, it is obvious that these
institutions would get more
attention and would be sub-
jected to greater scrutiny to
expose their strengths and
weaknesses.
At present HEIs in
Bangladesh, both public and
private, would generally be
considered as institutions of
higher learning focusing on
teachingwhere research isnot
done to the extent of creating
indigenous knowledge. The
major difference between a
teaching University and a
University that focuses on
research is that the latter gives
highpriority to the creationof
original knowledge that could
help the society in different
ways to forge ahead and
improve the standardof living
of its people.
If society inBangladesh is to
be restructured into a knowl-
edge-based one,HEIs have to
reevaluate their ownroles and
seriously engage in the cre-
ation of knowledge through
meaningful research relevant
to thesociety.Anumberof fac-
tors at present have restricted
HEIs in the country to emerge
as institutionscapableof con-
ducting research independ-
entlywithout looking for sup-
port from internationaldonor
agencies or NGOs.
Themajor factor that limits
HEIs inBangladesh toembark
on long-drawn research proj-
ects is the extremely limited
budgetwithwhich large scale
researchworkcannotbedone.
Also, many HEIs having no
specific researchobjectivesare
unable to motivate their aca-
demics to get involved in
research. Academicians, on
theirpart, complainabout lack
of incentives and a heavy
teaching load as deterrents.
It is only through ground-
breaking research that aca-
demicscandiscover theurgent
needsof societyandhowthese
can be addressed in order to
improve the condition of liv-
ingof thepeople. In countries
suchasHongKong,Singapore,
and Malaysia, academia has
been in the forefront of lead-
ing societies to positions of
strength in terms of improv-
ing the living standard of the
people, identification of soci-
etal requirements, and pro-
viding solutions to problems
with the help of indigenous
ideas. ResearchbasedHEIs in
these countries actually func-
tionas institutions that active-
ly help governments, by pro-
vidingexpertise, tobringabout
important changes. Outcome
of research done at HEIs
passed on to governments
transform societies, and citi-
zens are the ultimate benefi-
ciaries.
In Bangladesh it is now the
right time for HEIs to realize
thathave toworkas centresof
excellence by providing intel-
lectual leadership. For this,
HEIshave to fully understand
the expectations of the larger
society, and by comprehend-
ing the innermost feelings of
society, they can greatly con-
tribute the knowledge they
create, through research, so
that society can speed ahead
withmorevitality. Knowledge
in the ultimate analysis is
strengthandenergy that soci-
ety requiresmoreandmoreas
it strives to climb a certain
height necessary to deliver
benefits to those who are its
stakeholders.
The University Grants
Commission, the corporate
sector and Non Residential
Bangladeshis have to join
hands inorder to findways as
to how more money can be
made available to actively
encourage research at the
HEIs. Universities in the pri-
vate sector that have already
earnedrecognition for impart-
ing quality education must
also plough back to the
Universities a portion of the
profit to be spent solely for
research purposes.
The government on its part
cannot be complacent by
claiming that annual budget-
ary allocation for education is
very high.
A democratic government
doing its best to increase the
country’s annual growth rate
to 7 per cent in the coming
years should realize thatwith-
out the creationof knowledge
a society cannot progress as
much as desired. Therefore,
HEIs should be ensured suffi-
cient funding for research, and
theUGCcanmonitor tomake
sure that the money is spent
for not merely expanding
knowledge but for creating it.
It has to be borne in mind
that therecanbenosubstitute
to home grown knowledge
whichonlyacademiacanpro-
duce. By creating indigenous
knowledge many HEIs could
earn international recognition
asproducersoforiginalknowl-
edge beneficial to the society.
IfBangladeshhas tomove for-
ward rapidly in terms of eco-
nomic growth and social
progress imbuedwith thespir-
it of secular democracy, HEIs
have toemergeas realbastions
of locally unearthed knowl-
edge in the immediate future.
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